How the possibility of a fight-back strategy affects the consequences of a sanctions regime
Vol. 13, No 3, 2020
Mohammad Sadegh Karimi
Department of Energy Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Iran m_karimi@energy.sharif.edu ORCID 0000-0002-8768-1106 |
How the possibility of a fight-back strategy affects the consequences of a sanctions regime |
Abbas Maleki
Department of Energy Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Iran maleki@sharif.edu ORCID 0000-0003-2904-4587 *Corresponding author Asieh Haieri Yazdi
Centre for Energy, Petroleum, and Mineral Law and Policy (CEPMLP), School of Social Sciences, University of Dundee, UK 2391480@dundee.ac.uk ORCID 0000-0002-2116-3146
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Abstract. Sanctions imposed by a country against another country are considered as a foreign policy tool. Many studies have investigated different aspects of sanctions including the efficacy of sanctions to alter the target country’s behaviour. However, the effects of a potential fight-back strategy adopted by a target country have been discussed rarely. In this paper, the outcomes of a possible fight-back strategy are simulated using game theoretical analysis. To find the matching state of game theory and sanction regimes, we have conducted a critical and systematic review of 12 sanctions, from 1950 to 2012. The results show that the capability of a target country to implement fight-back strategies provides the opportunity to change the sender’s expected outcomes. It also makes the occurrence of future sanctions less probable or even less feasible. |
Received: November, 2019 1st Revision: May, 2020 Accepted: September, 2020 |
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DOI: 10.14254/2071-8330.2020/13-3/17
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JEL Classification: C73, F51, N45 |
Keywords: sanctions, game theory, fight-back strategy, rival country, Iran sanctions |